perf: streamline worker startup and consolidate database connections (#2122)

* docs: pathfinder refactor corpus + Node 20 preflight

Adds the PATHFINDER-2026-04-22 principle-driven refactor plan (11 docs,
cross-checked PASS) plus the exploratory PATHFINDER-2026-04-21 corpus
that motivated it. Bumps engines.node to >=20.0.0 per the ingestion-path
plan preflight (recursive fs.watch). Adds the pathfinder skill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 01 — data integrity

Schema, UNIQUE constraints, self-healing claim, Chroma upsert fallback.

- Phase 1: fresh schema.sql regenerated at post-refactor shape.
- Phase 2: migrations 23+24 — rebuild pending_messages without
  started_processing_at_epoch; UNIQUE(session_id, tool_use_id);
  UNIQUE(memory_session_id, content_hash) on observations; dedup
  duplicate rows before adding indexes.
- Phase 3: claimNextMessage rewritten to self-healing query using
  worker_pid NOT IN live_worker_pids; STALE_PROCESSING_THRESHOLD_MS
  and the 60-s stale-reset block deleted.
- Phase 4: DEDUP_WINDOW_MS and findDuplicateObservation deleted;
  observations.insert now uses ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
- Phase 5: failed-message purge block deleted from worker-service
  2-min interval; clearFailedOlderThan method deleted.
- Phase 6: repairMalformedSchema and its Python subprocess repair
  path deleted from Database.ts; SQLite errors now propagate.
- Phase 7: Chroma delete-then-add fallback gated behind
  CHROMA_SYNC_FALLBACK_ON_CONFLICT env flag as bridge until
  Chroma MCP ships native upsert.
- Phase 8: migration 19 no-op block absorbed into fresh schema.sql.

Verification greps all return 0 matches. bun test tests/sqlite/
passes 63/63. bun run build succeeds.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/01-data-integrity.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 02 — process lifecycle

OS process groups replace hand-rolled reapers. Worker runs until
killed; orphans are prevented by detached spawn + kill(-pgid).

- Phase 1: src/services/worker/ProcessRegistry.ts DELETED. The
  canonical registry at src/supervisor/process-registry.ts is the
  sole survivor; SDK spawn site consolidated into it via new
  createSdkSpawnFactory/spawnSdkProcess/getSdkProcessForSession/
  ensureSdkProcessExit/waitForSlot helpers.
- Phase 2: SDK children spawn with detached:true + stdio:
  ['ignore','pipe','pipe']; pgid recorded on ManagedProcessInfo.
- Phase 3: shutdown.ts signalProcess teardown uses
  process.kill(-pgid, signal) on Unix when pgid is recorded;
  Windows path unchanged (tree-kill/taskkill).
- Phase 4: all reaper intervals deleted — startOrphanReaper call,
  staleSessionReaperInterval setInterval (including the co-located
  WAL checkpoint — SQLite's built-in wal_autocheckpoint handles
  WAL growth without an app-level timer), killIdleDaemonChildren,
  killSystemOrphans, reapOrphanedProcesses, reapStaleSessions, and
  detectStaleGenerator. MAX_GENERATOR_IDLE_MS and MAX_SESSION_IDLE_MS
  constants deleted.
- Phase 5: abandonedTimer — already 0 matches; primary-path cleanup
  via generatorPromise.finally() already lives in worker-service
  startSessionProcessor and SessionRoutes ensureGeneratorRunning.
- Phase 6: evictIdlestSession and its evict callback deleted from
  SessionManager. Pool admission gates backpressure upstream.
- Phase 7: SDK-failure fallback — SessionManager has zero matches
  for fallbackAgent/Gemini/OpenRouter. Failures surface to hooks
  via exit code 2 through SessionRoutes error mapping.
- Phase 8: ensureWorkerRunning in worker-utils.ts rewritten to
  lazy-spawn — consults isWorkerPortAlive (which gates
  captureProcessStartToken for PID-reuse safety via commit
  99060bac), then spawns detached with unref(), then
  waitForWorkerPort({ attempts: 3, backoffMs: 250 }) hand-rolled
  exponential backoff 250→500→1000ms. No respawn npm dep.
- Phase 9: idle self-shutdown — zero matches for
  idleCheck/idleTimeout/IDLE_MAX_MS/idleShutdown. Worker exits
  only on external SIGTERM via supervisor signal handlers.

Three test files that exercised deleted code removed:
tests/worker/process-registry.test.ts,
tests/worker/session-lifecycle-guard.test.ts,
tests/services/worker/reap-stale-sessions.test.ts.
Pass count: 1451 → 1407 (-44), all attributable to deleted test
files. Zero new failures. 31 pre-existing failures remain
(schema-repair suite, logger-usage-standards, environmental
openclaw / plugin-distribution) — none introduced by Plan 02.

All 10 verification greps return 0. bun run build succeeds.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/02-process-lifecycle.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 04 (narrowed) — search fail-fast

Phases 3, 5, 6 only. Plan-doc inaccuracies for phases 1/2/4/7/8/9
deferred for plan reconciliation:
  - Phase 1/2: ObservationRow type doesn't exist; the four
    "formatters" operate on three incompatible types.
  - Phase 4: RECENCY_WINDOW_MS already imported from
    SEARCH_CONSTANTS at every call site.
  - Phase 7: getExistingChromaIds is NOT @deprecated and has an
    active caller in ChromaSync.backfillMissingSyncs.
  - Phase 8: estimateTokens already consolidated.
  - Phase 9: knowledge-corpus rewrite blocked on PG-3
    prompt-caching cost smoke test.

Phase 3 — Delete SearchManager.findByConcept/findByFile/findByType.
SearchRoutes handlers (handleSearchByConcept/File/Type) now call
searchManager.getOrchestrator().findByXxx() directly via new
getter accessors on SearchManager. ~250 LoC deleted.

Phase 5 — Fail-fast Chroma. Created
src/services/worker/search/errors.ts with ChromaUnavailableError
extends AppError(503, 'CHROMA_UNAVAILABLE'). Deleted
SearchOrchestrator.executeWithFallback's Chroma-failed
SQLite-fallback branch; runtime Chroma errors now throw 503.
"Path 3" (chromaSync was null at construction — explicit-
uninitialized config) preserved as legitimate empty-result state
per plan text. ChromaSearchStrategy.search no longer wraps in
try/catch — errors propagate.

Phase 6 — Delete HybridSearchStrategy three try/catch silent
fallback blocks (findByConcept, findByType, findByFile) at lines
~82-95, ~120-132, ~161-172. Removed `fellBack` field from
StrategySearchResult type and every return site
(SQLiteSearchStrategy, BaseSearchStrategy.emptyResult,
SearchOrchestrator).

Tests updated (Principle 7 — delete in same PR):
  - search-orchestrator.test.ts: "fall back to SQLite" rewritten
    as "throw ChromaUnavailableError (HTTP 503)".
  - chroma/hybrid/sqlite-search-strategy tests: rewritten to
    rejects.toThrow; removed fellBack assertions.

Verification: SearchManager.findBy → 0; fellBack → 0 in src/.
bun test tests/worker/search/ → 122 pass, 0 fail.
bun test (suite-wide) → 1407 pass, baseline maintained, 0 new
failures. bun run build succeeds.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/04-read-path.md (Phases 3, 5, 6)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 03 — ingestion path

Fail-fast parser, direct in-process ingest, recursive fs.watch,
DB-backed tool pairing. Worker-internal HTTP loopback eliminated.

- Phase 0: Created src/services/worker/http/shared.ts exporting
  ingestObservation/ingestPrompt/ingestSummary as direct
  in-process functions plus ingestEventBus (Node EventEmitter,
  reusing existing pattern — no third event bus introduced).
  setIngestContext wires the SessionManager dependency from
  worker-service constructor.
- Phase 1: src/sdk/parser.ts collapsed to one parseAgentXml
  returning { valid:true; kind: 'observation'|'summary'; data }
  | { valid:false; reason: string }. Inspects root element;
  <skip_summary reason="…"/> is a first-class summary case
  with skipped:true. NEVER returns undefined. NEVER coerces.
- Phase 2: ResponseProcessor calls parseAgentXml exactly once,
  branches on the discriminated union. On invalid → markFailed
  + logger.warn(reason). On observation → ingestObservation.
  On summary → ingestSummary then emit summaryStoredEvent
  { sessionId, messageId } (consumed by Plan 05's blocking
  /api/session/end).
- Phase 3: Deleted consecutiveSummaryFailures field
  (ResponseProcessor + SessionManager + worker-types) and
  MAX_CONSECUTIVE_SUMMARY_FAILURES constant. Circuit-breaker
  guards and "tripped" log lines removed.
- Phase 4: coerceObservationToSummary deleted from sdk/parser.ts.
- Phase 5: src/services/transcripts/watcher.ts rescan setInterval
  replaced with fs.watch(transcriptsRoot, { recursive: true,
  persistent: true }) — Node 20+ recursive mode.
- Phase 6: src/services/transcripts/processor.ts pendingTools
  Map deleted. tool_use rows insert with INSERT OR IGNORE on
  UNIQUE(session_id, tool_use_id) (added by Plan 01). New
  pairToolUsesByJoin query in PendingMessageStore for read-time
  pairing (UNIQUE INDEX provides idempotency; explicit consumer
  not yet wired).
- Phase 7: HTTP loopback at processor.ts:252 replaced with
  direct ingestObservation call. maybeParseJson silent-passthrough
  rewritten to fail-fast (throws on malformed JSON).
- Phase 8: src/utils/tag-stripping.ts countTags + stripTagsInternal
  collapsed into one alternation regex, single-pass over input.
- Phase 9: src/utils/transcript-parser.ts (dead TranscriptParser
  class) deleted. The active extractLastMessage at
  src/shared/transcript-parser.ts:41-144 is the sole survivor.

Tests updated (Principle 7 — same-PR delete):
  - tests/sdk/parser.test.ts + parse-summary.test.ts: rewritten
    to assert discriminated-union shape; coercion-specific
    scenarios collapse into { valid:false } assertions.
  - tests/worker/agents/response-processor.test.ts: circuit-breaker
    describe block skipped; non-XML/empty-response tests assert
    fail-fast markFailed behavior.

Verification: every grep returns 0. transcript-parser.ts deleted.
bun run build succeeds. bun test → 1399 pass / 28 fail / 7 skip
(net -8 pass = the 4 retired circuit-breaker tests + 4 collapsed
parser cases). Zero new failures vs baseline.

Deferred (out of Plan 03 scope, will land in Plan 06): SessionRoutes
HTTP route handlers still call sessionManager.queueObservation
inline rather than the new shared helpers — the helpers are ready,
the route swap is mechanical and belongs with the Zod refactor.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/03-ingestion-path.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 05 — hook surface

Worker-call plumbing collapsed to one helper. Polling replaced by
server-side blocking endpoint. Fail-loud counter surfaces persistent
worker outages via exit code 2.

- Phase 1: plugin/hooks/hooks.json — three 20-iteration `for i in
  1..20; do curl -sf .../health && break; sleep 0.1; done` shell
  retry wrappers deleted. Hook commands invoke their bun entry
  point directly.
- Phase 2: src/shared/worker-utils.ts — added
  executeWithWorkerFallback<T>(url, method, body) returning
  T | { continue: true; reason?: string }. All 8 hook handlers
  (observation, session-init, context, file-context, file-edit,
  summarize, session-complete, user-message) rewritten to use
  it instead of duplicating the ensureWorkerRunning →
  workerHttpRequest → fallback sequence.
- Phase 3: blocking POST /api/session/end in SessionRoutes.ts
  using validateBody + sessionEndSchema (z.object({sessionId})).
  One-shot ingestEventBus.on('summaryStoredEvent') listener,
  30 s timer, req.aborted handler — all share one cleanup so
  the listener cannot leak. summarize.ts polling loop, plus
  MAX_WAIT_FOR_SUMMARY_MS / POLL_INTERVAL_MS constants, deleted.
- Phase 4: src/shared/hook-settings.ts — loadFromFileOnce()
  memoizes SettingsDefaultsManager.loadFromFile per process.
  Per-handler settings reads collapsed.
- Phase 5: src/shared/should-track-project.ts — single exclusion
  check entry; isProjectExcluded no longer referenced from
  src/cli/handlers/.
- Phase 6: cwd validation pushed into adapter normalizeInput
  (all 6 adapters: claude-code, cursor, raw, gemini-cli,
  windsurf). New AdapterRejectedInput error in
  src/cli/adapters/errors.ts. Handler-level isValidCwd checks
  deleted from file-edit.ts and observation.ts. hook-command.ts
  catches AdapterRejectedInput → graceful fallback.
- Phase 7: session-init.ts conditional initAgent guard deleted;
  initAgent is idempotent. tests/hooks/context-reinjection-guard
  test (validated the deleted conditional) deleted in same PR
  per Principle 7.
- Phase 8: fail-loud counter at ~/.claude-mem/state/hook-failures
  .json. Atomic write via .tmp + rename. CLAUDE_MEM_HOOK_FAIL_LOUD
  _THRESHOLD setting (default 3). On consecutive worker-unreachable
  ≥ N: process.exit(2). On success: reset to 0. NOT a retry.
- Phase 9: ensureWorkerAliveOnce() module-scope memoization
  wrapping ensureWorkerRunning. executeWithWorkerFallback calls
  the memoized version.

Minimal validateBody middleware stub at
src/services/worker/http/middleware/validateBody.ts. Plan 06 will
expand with typed inference + error envelope conventions.

Verification: 4/4 grep targets pass. bun run build succeeds.
bun test → 1393 pass / 28 fail / 7 skip; -6 pass attributable
solely to deleted context-reinjection-guard test file. Zero new
failures vs baseline.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/05-hook-surface.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 06 — API surface

One Zod-based validator wrapping every POST/PUT. Rate limiter,
diagnostic endpoints, and shutdown wrappers deleted. Failure-
marking consolidated to one helper.

- Phase 1 (preflight): zod@^3 already installed.
- Phase 2: validateBody middleware confirmed at canonical shape
  in src/services/worker/http/middleware/validateBody.ts —
  safeParse → 400 { error: 'ValidationError', issues: [...] }
  on failure, replaces req.body with parsed value on success.
- Phase 3: Per-route Zod schemas declared at the top of each
  route file. 24 POST endpoints across SessionRoutes,
  CorpusRoutes, DataRoutes, MemoryRoutes, SearchRoutes,
  LogsRoutes, SettingsRoutes now wrap with validateBody().
  /api/session/end (Plan 05) confirmed using same middleware.
- Phase 4: validateRequired() deleted from BaseRouteHandler
  along with every call site. Inline coercion helpers
  (coerceStringArray, coercePositiveInteger) and inline
  if (!req.body...) guards deleted across all route files.
- Phase 5: Rate limiter middleware and its registration deleted
  from src/services/worker/http/middleware.ts. Worker binds
  127.0.0.1:37777 — no untrusted caller.
- Phase 6: viewer.html cached at module init in ViewerRoutes.ts
  via fs.readFileSync; served as Buffer with text/html content
  type. SKILL.md + per-operation .md files cached in
  Server.ts as Map<string, string>; loadInstructionContent
  helper deleted. NO fs.watch, NO TTL — process restart is the
  cache-invalidation event.
- Phase 7: Four diagnostic endpoints deleted from DataRoutes.ts
  — /api/pending-queue (GET), /api/pending-queue/process (POST),
  /api/pending-queue/failed (DELETE), /api/pending-queue/all
  (DELETE). Helper methods that ONLY served them
  (getQueueMessages, getStuckCount, getRecentlyProcessed,
  clearFailed, clearAll) deleted from PendingMessageStore.
  KEPT: /api/processing-status (observability), /health
  (used by ensureWorkerRunning).
- Phase 8: stopSupervisor wrapper deleted from supervisor/index.ts.
  GracefulShutdown now calls getSupervisor().stop() directly.
  Two functions retained with clear roles:
    - performGracefulShutdown — worker-side 6-step shutdown
    - runShutdownCascade — supervisor-side child teardown
      (process.kill(-pgid), Windows tree-kill, PID-file cleanup)
  Each has unique non-trivial logic and a single canonical caller.
- Phase 9: transitionMessagesTo(status, filter) is the sole
  failure-marking path on PendingMessageStore. Old methods
  markSessionMessagesFailed and markAllSessionMessagesAbandoned
  deleted along with all callers (worker-service,
  SessionCompletionHandler, tests/zombie-prevention).

Tests updated (Principle 7 same-PR delete): coercion test files
refactored to chain validateBody → handler. Zombie-prevention
tests rewritten to call transitionMessagesTo.

Verification: all 4 grep targets → 0. bun run build succeeds.
bun test → 1393 pass / 28 fail / 7 skip — exact match to
baseline. Zero new failures.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/06-api-surface.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: land PATHFINDER Plan 07 — dead code sweep

ts-prune-driven sweep across the tree after Plans 01-06 landed.
Deleted unused exports, orphan helpers, and one fully orphaned
file. Earlier-plan deletions verified.

Deleted:
- src/utils/bun-path.ts (entire file — getBunPath, getBunPathOrThrow,
  isBunAvailable: zero importers)
- bun-resolver.getBunVersionString: zero callers
- PendingMessageStore.retryMessage / resetProcessingToPending /
  abortMessage: superseded by transitionMessagesTo (Plan 06 Phase 9)
- EnvManager.MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_KEYS, EnvManager.setCredential:
  zero callers
- CodexCliInstaller.checkCodexCliStatus: zero callers; no status
  command exists in npx-cli
- Two "REMOVED: cleanupOrphanedSessions" stale-fence comments

Kept (with documented justification):
- Public API surface in dist/sdk/* (parseAgentXml, prompt
  builders, ParsedObservation, ParsedSummary, ParseResult,
  SUMMARY_MODE_MARKER) — exported via package.json sdk path.
- generateContext / loadContextConfig / token utilities — used
  via dynamic await import('../../../context-generator.js') in
  worker SearchRoutes.
- MCP_IDE_INSTALLERS, install/uninstall functions for codex/goose
  — used via dynamic await import in npx-cli/install.ts +
  uninstall.ts (ts-prune cannot trace dynamic imports).
- getExistingChromaIds — active caller in
  ChromaSync.backfillMissingSyncs (Plan 04 narrowed scope).
- processPendingQueues / getSessionsWithPendingMessages — active
  orphan-recovery caller in worker-service.ts plus
  zombie-prevention test coverage.
- StoreAndMarkCompleteResult legacy alias — return-type annotation
  in same file.
- All Database.ts barrel re-exports — used downstream.

Earlier-plan verification:
- Plan 03 Phase 9: VERIFIED — src/utils/transcript-parser.ts
  is gone; TranscriptParser has 0 references in src/.
- Plan 01 Phase 8: VERIFIED — migration 19 no-op absorbed.
- SessionStore.ts:52-70 consolidation NOT executed (deferred):
  the methods are not thin wrappers but ~900 LoC of bodies, and
  two methods are documented as intentional mirrors so the
  context-generator.cjs bundle stays schema-consistent without
  pulling MigrationRunner. Deserves its own plan, not a sweep.

Verification: TranscriptParser → 0; transcript-parser.ts → gone;
no commented-out code markers remain. bun run build succeeds.
bun test → 1393 pass / 28 fail / 7 skip — EXACT match to
baseline. Zero regressions.

Plan: PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/07-dead-code.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: remove residual ProcessRegistry comment reference

Plan 07 dead-code sweep missed one comment-level reference to the
deleted in-memory ProcessRegistry class in SessionManager.ts:347.
Rewritten to describe the supervisor.json scope without naming the
deleted class, completing the verification grep target.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Greptile review (P1 + 2× P2)

P1 — Plan 05 Phase 3 blocking endpoint was non-functional:
executeWithWorkerFallback used HEALTH_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS (3 s) for
the POST /api/session/end call, but the server holds the
connection for SERVER_SIDE_SUMMARY_TIMEOUT_MS (30 s). Client
always raced to a "timed out" rejection that isWorkerUnavailable
classified as worker-unreachable, so the hook silently degraded
instead of waiting for summaryStoredEvent.
  - Added optional timeoutMs to executeWithWorkerFallback,
    forwarded to workerHttpRequest.
  - summarize.ts call site now passes 35_000 (5 s above server
    hold window).

P2 — ingestSummary({ kind: 'parsed' }) branch was dead code:
ResponseProcessor emitted summaryStoredEvent directly via the
event bus, bypassing the centralized helper that the comment
claimed was the single source.
  - ResponseProcessor now calls ingestSummary({ kind: 'parsed',
    sessionDbId, messageId, contentSessionId, parsed }) so the
    event-emission path is single-sourced.
  - ingestSummary's requireContext() resolution moved inside the
    'queue' branch (the only branch that needs sessionManager /
    dbManager). 'parsed' is a pure event-bus emission and
    doesn't need worker-internal context — fixes mocked
    ResponseProcessor unit tests that don't call
    setIngestContext.

P2 — isWorkerFallback could false-positive on legitimate API
responses whose schema includes { continue: true, ... }:
  - Added a Symbol.for('claude-mem/worker-fallback') brand to
    WorkerFallback. isWorkerFallback now checks the brand, not
    a duck-typed property name.

Verification: bun run build succeeds. bun test → 1393 pass /
28 fail / 7 skip — exact baseline match. Zero new failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Greptile iteration 2 (P1 + P2)

P1 — summaryStoredEvent fired regardless of whether the row was
persisted. ResponseProcessor's call to ingestSummary({ kind:
'parsed' }) ran for every parsed.kind === 'summary' even when
result.summaryId came back null (e.g. FK violation, null
memory_session_id at commit). The blocking /api/session/end
endpoint then returned { ok: true } and the Stop hook logged
'Summary stored' for a non-existent row.

  - Gate ingestSummary call on (parsed.data.skipped ||
    session.lastSummaryStored). Skipped summaries are an explicit
    no-op bypass and still confirm; real summaries only confirm
    when storage actually wrote a row.
  - Non-skipped + summaryId === null path logs a warn and lets
    the server-side timeout (504) surface to the hook instead of
    a false ok:true.

P2 — PendingMessageStore.enqueue() returns 0 when INSERT OR
IGNORE suppresses a duplicate (the UNIQUE(session_id, tool_use_id)
constraint added by Plan 01 Phase 1). The two callers
(SessionManager.queueObservation and queueSummarize) previously
logged 'ENQUEUED messageId=0' which read like a row was inserted.

  - Branch on messageId === 0 and emit a 'DUP_SUPPRESSED' debug
    log instead of the misleading ENQUEUED line. No behavior
    change — the duplicate is still correctly suppressed by the
    DB (Principle 3); only the log surface is corrected.
  - confirmProcessed is never called with the enqueue() return
    value (it operates on session.processingMessageIds[] from
    claimNextMessage), so no caller is broken; the visibility
    fix prevents future misuse.

Verification: bun run build succeeds. bun test → 1393 pass /
28 fail / 7 skip — exact baseline match. Zero new failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Greptile iteration 3 (P1 + 2× P2)

- P1 worker-service.ts: wire ensureGeneratorRunning into the ingest
  context after SessionRoutes is constructed. setIngestContext runs
  before routes exist, so transcript-watcher observations queued via
  ingestObservation() had no way to auto-start the SDK generator.
  Added attachIngestGeneratorStarter() to patch the callback in.
- P2 shared.ts: IngestEventBus now sets maxListeners to 0. Concurrent
  /api/session/end calls register one listener each and clean up on
  completion, so the default-10 warning fires spuriously under normal
  load.
- P2 SessionRoutes.ts: handleObservationsByClaudeId now delegates to
  ingestObservation() instead of duplicating skip-tool / meta /
  privacy / queue logic. Single helper, matching the Plan 03 goal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Greptile iteration 4 (P1 tool-pair + P2 parse/path/doc)

- processor.handleToolResult: restore in-memory tool-use→tool-result
  pairing via session.pendingTools for schemas (e.g. Codex) whose
  tool_result events carry only tool_use_id + output. Without this,
  neither handler fired — all tool observations silently dropped.
- processor.maybeParseJson: return raw string on parse failure instead
  of throwing. Previously a single malformed JSON-shaped field caused
  handleLine's outer catch to discard the entire transcript line.
- watcher.deepestNonGlobAncestor: split on / and \\, emit empty string
  for purely-glob inputs so the caller skips the watch instead of
  anchoring fs.watch at the filesystem root. Windows-compatible.
- PendingMessageStore.enqueue: tighten docstring — callers today only
  log on the returned id; the SessionManager branches on id === 0.

* fix: forward tool_use_id through ingestObservation (Greptile iter 5)

P1 — Plan 01's UNIQUE(content_session_id, tool_use_id) dedup never
fired because the new shared ingest path dropped the toolUseId before
queueObservation. SQLite treats NULL values as distinct for UNIQUE,
so every replayed transcript line landed a duplicate row.

- shared.ingestObservation: forward payload.toolUseId to
  queueObservation so INSERT OR IGNORE can actually collapse.
- SessionRoutes.handleObservationsByClaudeId: destructure both
  tool_use_id (HTTP convention) and toolUseId (JS convention) from
  req.body and pass into ingestObservation.
- observationsByClaudeIdSchema: declare both keys explicitly so the
  validator doesn't rely on .passthrough() alone.

* fix: drop dead pairToolUsesByJoin, close session-end listener race

- PendingMessageStore: delete pairToolUsesByJoin. The method was never
  called and its self-join semantics are structurally incompatible
  with UNIQUE(content_session_id, tool_use_id): INSERT OR IGNORE
  collapses any second row with the same pair, so a self-join can
  only ever match a row to itself. In-memory pendingTools in
  processor.ts remains the pairing path for split-event schemas.

- IngestEventBus: retain a short-lived (60s) recentStored map keyed
  by sessionId. Populated on summaryStoredEvent emit, evicted on
  consume or TTL.

- handleSessionEnd: drain the recent-events buffer before attaching
  the listener. Closes the register-after-emit race where the summary
  can persist between the hook's summarize POST and its session/end
  POST — previously that window returned 504 after the 30s timeout.

* chore: merge origin/main into vivacious-teeth

Resolves conflicts with 15 commits on main (v12.3.9, security
observation types, Telegram notifier, PID-reuse worker start-guard).

Conflict resolution strategy:
- plugin/hooks/hooks.json, plugin/scripts/*.cjs, plugin/ui/viewer-bundle.js:
  kept ours — PATHFINDER Plan 05 deletes the for-i-in-1-to-20 curl retry
  loops and the built artifacts regenerate on build.
- src/cli/handlers/summarize.ts: kept ours — Plan 05 blocking
  POST /api/session/end supersedes main's fire-and-forget path.
- src/services/worker-service.ts: kept ours — Plan 05 ingest bus +
  summaryStoredEvent supersedes main's SessionCompletionHandler DI
  refactor + orphan-reaper fallback.
- src/services/worker/http/routes/SessionRoutes.ts: kept ours — same
  reason; generator .finally() Stop-hook self-clean is a guard for a
  path our blocking endpoint removes.
- src/services/worker/http/routes/CorpusRoutes.ts: merged — added
  security_alert / security_note to ALLOWED_CORPUS_TYPES (feature from
  #2084) while preserving our Zod validateBody schema.

Typecheck: 294 errors (vs 298 pre-merge). No new errors introduced; all
remaining are pre-existing (Component-enum gaps, DOM lib for viewer,
bun:sqlite types).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Greptile P2 findings

1) SessionRoutes.handleSessionEnd was the only route handler not wrapped
   in wrapHandler — synchronous exceptions would hang the client rather
   than surfacing as 500s. Wrap it like every other handler.

2) processor.handleToolResult only consumed the session.pendingTools
   entry when the tool_result arrived without a toolName. In the
   split-schema path where tool_result carries both toolName and toolId,
   the entry was never deleted and the map grew for the life of the
   session. Consume the entry whenever toolId is present.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: typing cleanup and viewer tsconfig split for PR feedback

- Add explicit return types for SessionStore query methods
- Exclude src/ui/viewer from root tsconfig, give it its own DOM-typed config
- Add bun to root tsconfig types, plus misc typing tweaks flagged by Greptile
- Rebuilt plugin/scripts/* artifacts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Greptile P2 findings (iter 2)

- PendingMessageStore.transitionMessagesTo: require sessionDbId (drop
  the unscoped-drain branch that would nuke every pending/processing
  row across all sessions if a future caller omitted the filter).
- IngestEventBus.takeRecentSummaryStored: make idempotent — keep the
  cached event until TTL eviction so a retried Stop hook's second
  /api/session/end returns immediately instead of hanging 30 s.
- TranscriptWatcher fs.watch callback: skip full glob scan for paths
  already tailed (JSONL appends fire on every line; only unknown
  paths warrant a rescan).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: call finalizeSession in terminal session paths (Greptile iter 3)

terminateSession and runFallbackForTerminatedSession previously called
SessionCompletionHandler.finalizeSession before removeSessionImmediate;
the refactor dropped those calls, leaving sdk_sessions.status='active'
for every session killed by wall-clock limit, unrecoverable error, or
exhausted fallback chain. The deleted reapStaleSessions interval was
the only prior backstop.

Re-wires finalizeSession (idempotent: marks completed, drains pending,
broadcasts) into both paths; no reaper reintroduced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: GC failed pending_messages rows at startup (Greptile iter 4)

Plan 07 deleted clearFailed/clearFailedOlderThan as "dead code", but
with the periodic sweep also removed, nothing reaps status='failed'
rows now — they accumulate indefinitely. Since claimNextMessage's
self-healing subquery scans this table, unbounded growth degrades
claim latency over time.

Re-introduces clearFailedOlderThan and calls it once at worker startup
(not a reaper — one-shot, idempotent). 7-day retention keeps enough
history for operator inspection while bounding the table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: finalize sessions on normal exit; cleanup hoist; share handler (iter 5)

1. startSessionProcessor success branch now calls completionHandler.
   finalizeSession before removeSessionImmediate. Hooks-disabled installs
   (and any Stop hook that fails before POST /api/sessions/complete) no
   longer leave sdk_sessions rows as status='active' forever. Idempotent
   — a subsequent /api/sessions/complete is a no-op.

2. Hoist SessionRoutes.handleSessionEnd cleanup declaration above the
   closures that reference it (TDZ safety; safe at runtime today but
   fragile if timeout ever shrinks).

3. SessionRoutes now receives WorkerService's shared SessionCompletionHandler
   instead of constructing its own — prevents silent divergence if the
   handler ever becomes stateful.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop runaway crash-recovery loop on dead sessions

Two distinct bugs were combining to keep a dead session restarting forever:

Bug 1 (uncaught "The operation was aborted."):
  child_process.spawn emits 'error' asynchronously for ENOENT/EACCES/abort
  signal aborts. spawnSdkProcess() never attached an 'error' listener, so
  any async spawn failure became uncaughtException and escaped to the
  daemon-level handler. Attach an 'error' listener immediately after spawn,
  before the !child.pid early-return, so async spawn errors are logged
  (with errno code) and swallowed locally.

Bug 2 (sliding-window limiter never trips on slow restart cadence):
  RestartGuard tripped only when restartTimestamps.length exceeded
  MAX_WINDOWED_RESTARTS (10) within RESTART_WINDOW_MS (60s). With the 8s
  exponential-backoff cap, only ~7-8 restarts fit in the window, so a dead
  session that fail-restart-fail-restart on 8s cycles would loop forever
  (consecutiveRestarts climbing past 30+ in observed logs). Add a
  consecutiveFailures counter that increments on every restart and resets
  only on recordSuccess(). Trip when consecutive failures exceed
  MAX_CONSECUTIVE_FAILURES (5) — meaning 5 restarts with zero successful
  processing in between proves the session is dead. Both guards now run in
  parallel: tight loops still trip the windowed cap; slow loops trip the
  consecutive-failure cap.

Also: when the SessionRoutes path trips the guard, drain pending messages
to 'abandoned' so the session does not reappear in
getSessionsWithPendingMessages and trigger another auto-start cycle. The
worker-service.ts path already does this via terminateSession.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: streamline worker startup and consolidate database connections

1. Database Pooling: Modified DatabaseManager, SessionStore, and SessionSearch to share a single bun:sqlite connection, eliminating redundant file descriptors.
2. Non-blocking Startup: Refactored WorktreeAdoption and Chroma backfill to run in the background (fire-and-forget), preventing them from stalling core initialization.
3. Diagnostic Routes: Added /api/chroma/status and bypassed the initialization guard for health/readiness endpoints to allow diagnostics during startup.
4. Robust Search: Implemented reliable SQLite FTS5 fallback in SearchManager for when Chroma (uvx) fails or is unavailable.
5. Code Cleanup: Removed redundant loopback MCP checks and mangled initialization logic from WorkerService.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hard-exclude observer-sessions from hooks; bundle migration 29 (#2124)

* fix: hard-exclude observer-sessions from hooks; backfill bundle migrations

Stop hook + SessionEnd hook were storing the SDK observer's own
init/continuation/summary prompts in user_prompts, leaking into the
viewer (meta-observation regression). 25 such rows accumulated.

- shouldTrackProject: hard-reject OBSERVER_SESSIONS_DIR (and its subtree)
  before consulting user-configured exclusion globs.
- summarize.ts (Stop) and session-complete.ts (SessionEnd): early-return
  when shouldTrackProject(cwd) is false, so the observer's own hooks
  cannot bootstrap the worker or queue a summary against the meta-session.
- SessionRoutes: cap user-prompt body at 256 KiB at the session-init
  boundary so a runaway observer prompt cannot blow up storage.
- SessionStore: add migration 29 (UNIQUE(memory_session_id, content_hash)
  on observations) inline so bundled artifacts (worker-service.cjs,
  context-generator.cjs) stay schema-consistent — without it, the
  ON CONFLICT clause in observation inserts throws.
- spawnSdkProcess: stdio[stdin] from 'ignore' to 'pipe' so the
  supervisor can actually feed the observer's stdin.

Also rebuilds plugin/scripts/{worker-service,context-generator}.cjs.

* fix: walk back to UTF-8 boundary on prompt truncation (Greptile P2)

Plain Buffer.subarray at MAX_USER_PROMPT_BYTES can land mid-codepoint,
which the utf8 decoder silently rewrites to U+FFFD. Walk back over any
continuation bytes (0b10xxxxxx) before decoding so the truncated prompt
ends on a valid sequence boundary instead of a replacement character.

* fix: cross-platform observer-dir containment; clarify SDK stdin pipe

claude-review feedback on PR #2124.

- shouldTrackProject: literal `cwd.startsWith(OBSERVER_SESSIONS_DIR + '/')`
  hard-coded a POSIX separator and missed Windows backslash paths plus any
  trailing-slash variance. Switched to a path.relative-based isWithin()
  helper so Windows hook input under observer-sessions\\... is also excluded.
- spawnSdkProcess: added a comment explaining why stdin must be 'pipe' —
  SpawnedSdkProcess.stdin is typed NonNullable and the Claude Agent SDK
  consumes that pipe; 'ignore' would null it and the null-check below
  would tear the child down on every spawn.

* fix: make Stop hook fire-and-forget; remove dead /api/session/end

The Stop hook was awaiting a 35-second long-poll on /api/session/end,
which the worker held open until the summary-stored event fired (or its
30s server-side timeout elapsed). Followed by another await on
/api/sessions/complete. Three sequential awaits, the middle one a 30s
hold — not fire-and-forget despite repeated requests.

The Stop hook now does ONE thing: POST /api/sessions/summarize to
queue the summary work and return. The worker drives the rest async.
Session-map cleanup is performed by the SessionEnd handler
(session-complete.ts), not duplicated here.

- summarize.ts: drop the /api/session/end long-poll and the trailing
  /api/sessions/complete await; ~40 lines removed; unused
  SessionEndResponse interface gone; header comment rewritten.
- SessionRoutes: delete handleSessionEnd, sessionEndSchema, the
  SERVER_SIDE_SUMMARY_TIMEOUT_MS constant, and the /api/session/end
  route registration. Drop the now-unused ingestEventBus and
  SummaryStoredEvent imports.
- ResponseProcessor + shared.ts + worker-utils.ts: update stale
  comments that referenced the dead endpoint. The IngestEventBus is
  left in place dormant (no listeners) for follow-up cleanup so this
  PR stays focused on the blocker.

Bundle artifact (worker-service.cjs) rebuilt via build-and-sync.

Verification:
- grep '/api/session/end' plugin/scripts/worker-service.cjs → 0
- grep 'timeoutMs:35' plugin/scripts/worker-service.cjs → 0
- Worker restarted clean, /api/health ok at pid 92368

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* deps: bump all dependencies to latest including majors

Upgrades: React 18→19, Express 4→5, Zod 3→4, TypeScript 5→6,
@types/node 20→25, @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.1→0.2,
@clack/prompts 0.9→1.2, plus minors. Adds Daily Maintenance section
to CLAUDE.md mandating latest-version policy across manifests.

Express 5 surfaced a race in Server.listen() where the 'error' handler
was attached after listen() was invoked; refactored to use
http.createServer with both 'error' and 'listening' handlers attached
before listen(), restoring port-conflict rejection semantics.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: surface real chroma errors and add deep status probe

Replace the misleading "Vector search failed - semantic search unavailable.
Install uv... restart the worker." string in SearchManager with the actual
exception text from chroma_query_documents. The lying message blamed `uv`
for any failure — even when the real cause was a chroma-mcp transport
timeout, an empty collection, or a dead subprocess.

Also add /api/chroma/status?deep=1 backed by a new
ChromaMcpManager.probeSemanticSearch() that round-trips a real query
(chroma_list_collections + chroma_query_documents) instead of just
checking the stdio handshake. The cheap default path is unchanged.

Includes the diagnostic plan (PLAN-fix-mcp-search.md) and updated test
fixtures for the new structured failure message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: rebuild worker-service bundle to match merged src

Bundle was stale after the squash merge of #2124 — it still contained
the old "Install uv... semantic search unavailable" string and lacked
probeSemanticSearch. Rebuilt via bun run build-and-sync.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: address coderabbit feedback on PLAN-fix-mcp-search.md

- replace machine-specific /Users/alexnewman absolute paths with portable
  <repo-root> placeholder (MD-style portability)
- add blank lines around the TypeScript fenced block (MD031)
- tag the bare fenced block with `text` (MD040)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alex Newman
2026-04-25 13:37:40 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8ace1d9c84
commit 94d592f212
159 changed files with 18091 additions and 5843 deletions
+6 -9
View File
@@ -146,10 +146,6 @@ export async function startSupervisor(): Promise<void> {
await supervisorSingleton.start();
}
export async function stopSupervisor(): Promise<void> {
await supervisorSingleton.stop();
}
export function getSupervisor(): Supervisor {
return supervisorSingleton;
}
@@ -168,7 +164,7 @@ export function validateWorkerPidFile(options: ValidateWorkerPidOptions = {}): V
let pidInfo: PidInfo | null = null;
try {
pidInfo = JSON.parse(readFileSync(pidFilePath, 'utf-8')) as PidInfo;
pidInfo = JSON.parse(readFileSync(pidFilePath, 'utf-8')) as PidInfo | null;
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
logger.warn('SYSTEM', 'Failed to parse worker PID file, removing it', { path: pidFilePath }, error);
@@ -182,7 +178,8 @@ export function validateWorkerPidFile(options: ValidateWorkerPidOptions = {}): V
return 'invalid';
}
if (verifyPidFileOwnership(pidInfo)) {
const isAlive = verifyPidFileOwnership(pidInfo);
if (isAlive && pidInfo) {
if (options.logAlive ?? true) {
logger.info('SYSTEM', 'Worker already running (PID alive)', {
existingPid: pidInfo.pid,
@@ -194,9 +191,9 @@ export function validateWorkerPidFile(options: ValidateWorkerPidOptions = {}): V
}
logger.info('SYSTEM', 'Removing stale PID file (worker process is dead or PID has been reused)', {
pid: pidInfo.pid,
port: pidInfo.port,
startedAt: pidInfo.startedAt
pid: pidInfo?.pid,
port: pidInfo?.port,
startedAt: pidInfo?.startedAt
});
rmSync(pidFilePath, { force: true });
return 'stale';
+430 -7
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
import { ChildProcess, spawnSync } from 'child_process';
import { ChildProcess, spawn, spawnSync } from 'child_process';
import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'fs';
import { homedir } from 'os';
import path from 'path';
import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js';
import { sanitizeEnv } from './env-sanitizer.js';
const REAP_SESSION_SIGTERM_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
const REAP_SESSION_SIGKILL_TIMEOUT_MS = 1_000;
@@ -15,6 +16,14 @@ export interface ManagedProcessInfo {
type: string;
sessionId?: string | number;
startedAt: string;
// POSIX process group leader PID for group-scoped teardown.
// On Unix, when a child is spawned with `detached: true`, the kernel calls
// setpgid() and the child becomes the leader of its own group — its pgid
// equals its pid. Stored so `process.kill(-pgid, signal)` can tear down
// the child AND every descendant it spawned in one syscall (Principle 5).
// Undefined on Windows (no POSIX groups) and for processes that were not
// spawned with detached: true (e.g. the worker itself, MCP stdio clients).
pgid?: number;
}
export interface ManagedProcessRecord extends ManagedProcessInfo {
@@ -303,22 +312,30 @@ export class ProcessRegistry {
pids: sessionRecords.map(r => r.pid)
});
// Phase 1: SIGTERM all alive processes
// Phase 1: SIGTERM all alive processes — use process-group teardown for
// records that carry pgid so any descendants the SDK spawned are killed
// too (Principle 5).
const aliveRecords = sessionRecords.filter(r => isPidAlive(r.pid));
for (const record of aliveRecords) {
try {
process.kill(record.pid, 'SIGTERM');
if (typeof record.pgid === 'number' && process.platform !== 'win32') {
process.kill(-record.pgid, 'SIGTERM');
} else {
process.kill(record.pid, 'SIGTERM');
}
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code !== 'ESRCH') {
logger.debug('SYSTEM', `Failed to SIGTERM session process PID ${record.pid}`, {
pid: record.pid
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid
}, error);
}
} else {
logger.warn('SYSTEM', `Failed to SIGTERM session process PID ${record.pid} (non-Error)`, {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
error: String(error)
});
}
@@ -333,26 +350,34 @@ export class ProcessRegistry {
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
}
// Phase 3: SIGKILL any survivors
// Phase 3: SIGKILL any survivors — process-group teardown when pgid is
// recorded so descendants are killed too.
const survivors = aliveRecords.filter(r => isPidAlive(r.pid));
for (const record of survivors) {
logger.warn('SYSTEM', `Session process PID ${record.pid} did not exit after SIGTERM, sending SIGKILL`, {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
sessionId: sessionIdNum
});
try {
process.kill(record.pid, 'SIGKILL');
if (typeof record.pgid === 'number' && process.platform !== 'win32') {
process.kill(-record.pgid, 'SIGKILL');
} else {
process.kill(record.pid, 'SIGKILL');
}
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code !== 'ESRCH') {
logger.debug('SYSTEM', `Failed to SIGKILL session process PID ${record.pid}`, {
pid: record.pid
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid
}, error);
}
} else {
logger.warn('SYSTEM', `Failed to SIGKILL session process PID ${record.pid} (non-Error)`, {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
error: String(error)
});
}
@@ -406,3 +431,401 @@ export function getProcessRegistry(): ProcessRegistry {
export function createProcessRegistry(registryPath: string): ProcessRegistry {
return new ProcessRegistry(registryPath);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// SDK session lookup + exit verification
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface TrackedSdkProcess {
pid: number;
pgid: number | undefined;
sessionDbId: number;
process: ChildProcess;
}
/**
* Look up the live SDK subprocess for a given session, if any.
*
* Returns undefined when no SDK record is registered for the session, or
* when the ChildProcess reference has been dropped (process exited and was
* unregistered). Warns on duplicates — multiple SDK records per session
* indicate a race in createSdkSpawnFactory's pre-spawn cleanup.
*/
export function getSdkProcessForSession(sessionDbId: number): TrackedSdkProcess | undefined {
const registry = getProcessRegistry();
const matches = registry.getBySession(sessionDbId).filter(r => r.type === 'sdk');
if (matches.length > 1) {
logger.warn('PROCESS', `Multiple SDK processes found for session ${sessionDbId}`, {
count: matches.length,
pids: matches.map(m => m.pid),
});
}
const record = matches[0];
if (!record) return undefined;
const processRef = registry.getRuntimeProcess(record.id);
if (!processRef) return undefined;
return {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
sessionDbId,
process: processRef,
};
}
/**
* Wait for an SDK subprocess to exit, escalating to SIGKILL on the process
* group if it overstays `timeoutMs`. Fully event-driven — no polling.
*
* This is primary-path cleanup invoked from session-level finally() blocks
* when a session ends; it is NOT a reaper. It runs at most once per session
* deletion. Process-group teardown (`kill(-pgid, SIGKILL)`) ensures any
* descendants the SDK spawned are also killed.
*/
export async function ensureSdkProcessExit(
tracked: TrackedSdkProcess,
timeoutMs: number = 5000
): Promise<void> {
const { pid, pgid, process: proc } = tracked;
// Already exited? Trust exitCode, not proc.killed — proc.killed only means
// Node sent a signal; the process may still be running.
if (proc.exitCode !== null) return;
const exitPromise = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
proc.once('exit', () => resolve());
});
const timeoutPromise = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
setTimeout(resolve, timeoutMs);
});
await Promise.race([exitPromise, timeoutPromise]);
if (proc.exitCode !== null) return;
// Timeout: escalate to SIGKILL on the whole process group so any
// descendants the SDK spawned are killed too (Principle 5).
logger.warn('PROCESS', `PID ${pid} did not exit after ${timeoutMs}ms, sending SIGKILL to process group`, {
pid, pgid, timeoutMs,
});
try {
if (typeof pgid === 'number' && process.platform !== 'win32') {
process.kill(-pgid, 'SIGKILL');
} else {
proc.kill('SIGKILL');
}
} catch {
// Already dead — fine.
}
// Wait up to 1s for SIGKILL to take effect (event-driven, not blind sleep).
const sigkillExit = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
proc.once('exit', () => resolve());
});
const sigkillTimeout = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
setTimeout(resolve, 1000);
});
await Promise.race([sigkillExit, sigkillTimeout]);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Pool slot waiters — backpressure without eviction
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// waitForSlot is used by SDKAgent to avoid starting more concurrent SDK
// subprocesses than configured. It is event-driven: when a process exits and
// is unregistered, notifySlotAvailable() wakes exactly one waiter. There is
// no polling. There is no idle-session eviction (Principle 1 — do not kick
// live sessions to make room; a full pool must apply backpressure upstream).
const TOTAL_PROCESS_HARD_CAP = 10;
const slotWaiters: Array<() => void> = [];
function getActiveSdkCount(): number {
return getProcessRegistry().getAll().filter(record => record.type === 'sdk').length;
}
function notifySlotAvailable(): void {
const waiter = slotWaiters.shift();
if (waiter) waiter();
}
/**
* Wait until a pool slot is available to spawn another SDK subprocess.
*
* Resolves immediately when active SDK process count is below `maxConcurrent`.
* Otherwise enqueues a waiter that is woken by a subsequent exit handler.
* Rejects with a timeout error if no slot opens within `timeoutMs`.
* Rejects immediately if the registry is already at the hard cap.
*/
export async function waitForSlot(maxConcurrent: number, timeoutMs: number = 60_000): Promise<void> {
const activeCount = getActiveSdkCount();
if (activeCount >= TOTAL_PROCESS_HARD_CAP) {
throw new Error(`Hard cap exceeded: ${activeCount} processes in registry (cap=${TOTAL_PROCESS_HARD_CAP}). Refusing to spawn more.`);
}
if (activeCount < maxConcurrent) return;
logger.info('PROCESS', `Pool limit reached (${activeCount}/${maxConcurrent}), waiting for slot...`);
return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
const idx = slotWaiters.indexOf(onSlot);
if (idx >= 0) slotWaiters.splice(idx, 1);
reject(new Error(`Timed out waiting for agent pool slot after ${timeoutMs}ms`));
}, timeoutMs);
const onSlot = () => {
clearTimeout(timeout);
if (getActiveSdkCount() < maxConcurrent) {
resolve();
} else {
slotWaiters.push(onSlot);
}
};
slotWaiters.push(onSlot);
});
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// SDK subprocess spawn
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface SpawnedSdkProcess {
stdin: NonNullable<ChildProcess['stdin']>;
stdout: NonNullable<ChildProcess['stdout']>;
stderr: NonNullable<ChildProcess['stderr']>;
readonly killed: boolean;
readonly exitCode: number | null;
kill: ChildProcess['kill'];
on: ChildProcess['on'];
once: ChildProcess['once'];
off: ChildProcess['off'];
}
export interface SpawnSdkOptions {
command: string;
args: string[];
cwd?: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
signal?: AbortSignal;
}
/**
* Spawn a Claude SDK subprocess in its own POSIX process group.
*
* The spawn uses `detached: true` so the child becomes the leader of a new
* process group (setpgid). The leader's PID equals its pgid on Unix, so we
* store `child.pid` as both pid and pgid on the managed process record.
* Shutdown then signals the group via `process.kill(-pgid, signal)`, tearing
* down the SDK child AND every descendant in one syscall (Principle 5).
*
* Windows caveat: `detached: true` does not create a POSIX group. The
* recorded pgid is still the child PID so Windows teardown at least kills
* the direct child; full subtree teardown on Windows requires Job Objects
* or `taskkill /T /F` (see shutdown.ts).
*
* Node's child_process.spawn is used intentionally — Bun.spawn does NOT
* support `detached: true` (see PATHFINDER-2026-04-22/_reference.md Part 2
* row 3), and this module must work under Bun as well as Node.
*/
export function spawnSdkProcess(
sessionDbId: number,
options: SpawnSdkOptions
): { process: SpawnedSdkProcess; pid: number; pgid: number } | null {
const registry = getProcessRegistry();
// On Windows, use cmd.exe wrapper for .cmd files to properly handle paths with spaces.
const useCmdWrapper = process.platform === 'win32' && options.command.endsWith('.cmd');
const env = sanitizeEnv(options.env ?? process.env);
// Filter empty string args AND their preceding flag (Issue #2049).
// The Agent SDK emits ["--setting-sources", ""] when settingSources defaults to [].
// Simply dropping "" leaves an orphan --setting-sources that consumes the next
// flag as its value, crashing Claude Code 2.1.109+ with
// "Invalid setting source: --permission-mode". Drop the flag too so the SDK
// default (no setting sources) is preserved by omission.
const filteredArgs: string[] = [];
for (const arg of options.args) {
if (arg === '') {
if (filteredArgs.length > 0 && filteredArgs[filteredArgs.length - 1].startsWith('--')) {
filteredArgs.pop();
}
continue;
}
filteredArgs.push(arg);
}
// Unix: detached:true causes the kernel to setpgid() on the child so the
// child becomes leader of a new process group whose pgid equals its pid.
// Windows: detached:true decouples the child from the parent console; there
// is no POSIX group, but the flag is still safe to pass.
//
// stdin must be 'pipe' (not 'ignore') because SpawnedSdkProcess.stdin is
// typed NonNullable<...> and the Claude Agent SDK consumes that pipe to
// stream prompts in. With 'ignore', child.stdin would be null and the
// null-check below (line ~737) would tear the child down immediately.
const child = useCmdWrapper
? spawn('cmd.exe', ['/d', '/c', options.command, ...filteredArgs], {
cwd: options.cwd,
env,
detached: true,
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
signal: options.signal,
windowsHide: true,
})
: spawn(options.command, filteredArgs, {
cwd: options.cwd,
env,
detached: true,
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
signal: options.signal,
windowsHide: true,
});
// ALWAYS attach an 'error' listener BEFORE any other code runs, regardless of
// whether the child has a PID. child_process.spawn emits 'error' asynchronously
// for ENOENT, EACCES, AbortSignal-driven aborts, etc. Without a listener these
// become uncaughtException — the cause of "The operation was aborted." escaping
// to the daemon during crash-recovery loops.
child.on('error', (err: Error) => {
logger.warn('SDK_SPAWN', `[session-${sessionDbId}] child emitted error event`, {
sessionDbId,
pid: child.pid,
errorName: err.name,
errorCode: (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code,
}, err);
});
if (!child.pid) {
logger.error('PROCESS', 'Spawn succeeded but produced no PID', { sessionDbId });
return null;
}
const pid = child.pid;
const pgid = pid; // On Unix with detached:true, pgid === pid. On Windows, this is an alias.
// Capture stderr for debugging spawn failures.
if (child.stderr) {
child.stderr.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
logger.debug('SDK_SPAWN', `[session-${sessionDbId}] stderr: ${data.toString().trim()}`);
});
}
// Register the process in the supervisor registry with pgid recorded so
// the shutdown cascade can signal the whole group.
const recordId = `sdk:${sessionDbId}:${pid}`;
registry.register(recordId, {
pid,
type: 'sdk',
sessionId: sessionDbId,
startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
pgid,
}, child);
// Auto-unregister on exit. child.on('exit') is the authoritative event-driven
// signal that a process has left — no polling, no sweeper needed (Principle 4).
child.on('exit', (code: number | null, signal: string | null) => {
if (code !== 0) {
logger.warn('SDK_SPAWN', `[session-${sessionDbId}] Claude process exited`, { code, signal, pid });
}
registry.unregister(recordId);
// Wake one pool-slot waiter since a slot just freed up.
notifySlotAvailable();
});
if (!child.stdin || !child.stdout || !child.stderr) {
logger.error('PROCESS', 'Spawned SDK child missing required stdio streams', {
sessionDbId,
pid,
hasStdin: Boolean(child.stdin),
hasStdout: Boolean(child.stdout),
hasStderr: Boolean(child.stderr),
});
try { child.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch { /* already dead */ }
return null;
}
const spawned: SpawnedSdkProcess = {
stdin: child.stdin,
stdout: child.stdout,
stderr: child.stderr,
get killed() { return child.killed; },
get exitCode() { return child.exitCode; },
kill: child.kill.bind(child),
on: child.on.bind(child),
once: child.once.bind(child),
off: child.off.bind(child),
};
return { process: spawned, pid, pgid };
}
/**
* SDK-compatible spawn factory.
*
* The Claude Agent SDK's `spawnClaudeCodeProcess` option calls our factory
* with its own spawn arguments; we forward them into `spawnSdkProcess` which
* creates the child in its own process group and records it in the supervisor
* registry. The returned shape is the minimal subset of ChildProcess that the
* SDK consumes — stdin/stdout/stderr pipes, killed/exitCode getters, and
* kill/on/once/off.
*
* Pre-spawn cleanup: if a previous process for this session is still alive
* (e.g. a crash-recovery attempt that collided with a still-running SDK),
* SIGTERM it. Multiple processes sharing the same --resume UUID waste API
* credits and can conflict with each other (Issue #1590).
*/
export function createSdkSpawnFactory(sessionDbId: number) {
return (spawnOptions: SpawnSdkOptions): SpawnedSdkProcess => {
const registry = getProcessRegistry();
// Kill any existing process for this session before spawning a new one.
const existing = registry.getBySession(sessionDbId).filter(r => r.type === 'sdk');
for (const record of existing) {
if (!isPidAlive(record.pid)) continue;
try {
if (typeof record.pgid === 'number') {
// Signal the whole group — kill the SDK child and any descendants.
if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
process.kill(-record.pgid, 'SIGTERM');
} else {
process.kill(record.pid, 'SIGTERM');
}
} else {
process.kill(record.pid, 'SIGTERM');
}
logger.warn('PROCESS', `Killing duplicate SDK process PID ${record.pid} before spawning new one for session ${sessionDbId}`, {
existingPid: record.pid,
sessionDbId,
});
} catch (error: unknown) {
const code = error instanceof Error ? (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code : undefined;
if (code !== 'ESRCH') {
if (error instanceof Error) {
logger.warn('PROCESS', `Failed to SIGTERM duplicate SDK process PID ${record.pid}`, { sessionDbId }, error);
} else {
logger.warn('PROCESS', `Failed to SIGTERM duplicate SDK process PID ${record.pid} (non-Error)`, {
sessionDbId, error: String(error),
});
}
}
}
}
const result = spawnSdkProcess(sessionDbId, spawnOptions);
if (!result) {
// Match the legacy failure mode: the SDK needs a process-like object
// even on spawn failure; throwing here surfaces via exit code 2 to the
// hook layer (Principle 2 — fail-fast).
throw new Error(`Failed to spawn SDK subprocess for session ${sessionDbId}`);
}
return result.process;
};
}
+60 -40
View File
@@ -34,16 +34,18 @@ export async function runShutdownCascade(options: ShutdownCascadeOptions): Promi
}
try {
await signalProcess(record.pid, 'SIGTERM');
await signalProcess(record, 'SIGTERM');
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
logger.debug('SYSTEM', 'Failed to send SIGTERM to child process', {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
type: record.type
}, error);
} else {
logger.warn('SYSTEM', 'Failed to send SIGTERM to child process (non-Error)', {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
type: record.type,
error: String(error)
});
@@ -56,16 +58,18 @@ export async function runShutdownCascade(options: ShutdownCascadeOptions): Promi
const survivors = childRecords.filter(record => isPidAlive(record.pid));
for (const record of survivors) {
try {
await signalProcess(record.pid, 'SIGKILL');
await signalProcess(record, 'SIGKILL');
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
logger.debug('SYSTEM', 'Failed to force kill child process', {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
type: record.type
}, error);
} else {
logger.warn('SYSTEM', 'Failed to force kill child process (non-Error)', {
pid: record.pid,
pgid: record.pgid,
type: record.type,
error: String(error)
});
@@ -110,7 +114,38 @@ async function waitForExit(records: ManagedProcessRecord[], timeoutMs: number):
}
}
async function signalProcess(pid: number, signal: 'SIGTERM' | 'SIGKILL'): Promise<void> {
async function signalProcess(record: ManagedProcessRecord, signal: 'SIGTERM' | 'SIGKILL'): Promise<void> {
const { pid, pgid } = record;
// Unix path: when the record carries a pgid (set when the child was spawned
// with detached:true so it became its own group leader), signal the negative
// PID to tear down the whole process group in one syscall — the SDK child
// AND every descendant it spawned. This replaces hand-rolled orphan sweeps
// (Principle 5: OS-supervised process groups over hand-rolled reapers).
//
// Falls back to single-PID kill when pgid is absent (the worker itself,
// MCP stdio clients, anything not spawned with detached:true).
if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
try {
if (typeof pgid === 'number') {
process.kill(-pgid, signal);
} else {
process.kill(pid, signal);
}
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
const errno = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (errno === 'ESRCH') {
return;
}
}
throw error;
}
return;
}
// Windows: no POSIX process groups. SIGTERM uses single-PID kill; SIGKILL
// uses tree-kill or taskkill /T to walk the descendant tree.
if (signal === 'SIGTERM') {
try {
process.kill(pid, signal);
@@ -126,50 +161,35 @@ async function signalProcess(pid: number, signal: 'SIGTERM' | 'SIGKILL'): Promis
return;
}
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
const treeKill = await loadTreeKill();
if (treeKill) {
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
treeKill(pid, signal, (error) => {
if (!error) {
resolve();
return;
}
const treeKill = await loadTreeKill();
if (treeKill) {
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
treeKill(pid, signal, (error) => {
if (!error) {
resolve();
return;
}
const errno = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (errno === 'ESRCH') {
resolve();
return;
}
reject(error);
});
const errno = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (errno === 'ESRCH') {
resolve();
return;
}
reject(error);
});
return;
}
const args = ['/PID', String(pid), '/T'];
if (signal === 'SIGKILL') {
args.push('/F');
}
await execFileAsync('taskkill', args, {
timeout: HOOK_TIMEOUTS.POWERSHELL_COMMAND,
windowsHide: true
});
return;
}
try {
process.kill(pid, signal);
} catch (error: unknown) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
const errno = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (errno === 'ESRCH') {
return;
}
}
throw error;
const args = ['/PID', String(pid), '/T'];
if (signal === 'SIGKILL') {
args.push('/F');
}
await execFileAsync('taskkill', args, {
timeout: HOOK_TIMEOUTS.POWERSHELL_COMMAND,
windowsHide: true
});
}
async function loadTreeKill(): Promise<TreeKillFn | null> {