Files
Alex Newman d384d3c595 fix: bug-batch — 17 issues + 4 foundations (chroma, opencode, parser, OAuth, paths, uptime, classification) (#2282)
* feat: foundations F1-F4 + simple bug fixes

Foundations (no consumer adoption yet):
- F1 spawnHidden wrapper at src/shared/spawn.ts
- F2 paths namespace with 18 accessors + invariant test (tests/shared/paths.test.ts)
- F3 getUptimeSeconds at src/shared/uptime.ts
- F4 ClassifiedProviderError at src/services/worker/provider-errors.ts + 6 tests

Issue fixes (file-isolated, parallel-safe):
- #2231: SECURITY.md at repo root for GitHub Security tab
- #2240: dedupe observationIds before Chroma sync (ResponseProcessor.ts)
- #2247: add task_complete to Codex session-end events
- #2243: rsync excludes scripts/package.json + scripts/node_modules

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: validate Claude executable with --version and detect desktop app

Extract findClaudeExecutable() into shared utility used by both
SDKAgent and KnowledgeAgent (deduplication). Every candidate is now
validated with --version (3s timeout). Desktop app executables in
AppData/Program Files get an actionable error message directing
users to install the CLI via npm.

Closes #2222

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use Zod schemas in OpenCode plugin to fix _zod.def crash

OpenCode 1.14.x walks arg._zod.def at plugin registration, which
crashes on plain JSON Schema objects like {type: "string"}. Replace
with z.string().describe() so the Zod internals are present.

Closes #2226, #2225, #2154

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: neutralize chroma-mcp CPU storm at the root

Two surgical fixes to the chroma backfill path that together cause the
sustained 60–80% CPU + orphan accumulation pattern reported across

1. ChromaMcpManager.getSpawnEnv: cap embedding-thread fanout
   ONNX Runtime / OpenBLAS / MKL all default to cpu_count(), so a 12-core
   machine spins 12 threads burning embeddings concurrently. The user's
   getSpawnEnv only handled SSL certs — no thread limits at all. Inject
   OMP_NUM_THREADS / ONNX_NUM_THREADS / OPENBLAS_NUM_THREADS / MKL_NUM_THREADS
   defaults of 2 (only if user hasn't pinned them), and
   ANONYMIZED_TELEMETRY=false to stop background HTTP from the embedding
   subprocess. Closes the storm at the source.

2. ChromaSync.backfill{Observations,Summaries,Prompts}: per-batch watermark
   The bump was in a trailing finally block. SIGKILL / OOM / power loss
   mid-flight skips finally entirely, so the watermark stayed at 0 and the
   next worker boot re-embedded the entire history (16K obs in #2220's
   case), which then pegged CPU forever in combination with (1). Move the
   bump inside the loop so progress is durable per batch.
   Closes #2214.

Verification:
- 26/26 chroma tests pass (tests/services/sync, tests/integration/chroma-vector-sync)
- Bundle confirms thread caps and per-batch bumps are present
- Full suite: 1429 pass / 20 fail — pre-existing failures only, no
  regression vs v12.4.9 baseline (1429 pass / 27 fail)

Closes #2214.
Substantially de-amplifies #2220 (the structural Job-Object cleanup is
still tracked separately at #2216).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: kill chroma-mcp process tree and limit backfill concurrency

Three fixes for orphan chroma-mcp processes and resource exhaustion:

1. killProcessTree() in ChromaMcpManager.stop() tears down the full
   uvx->uv->python->chroma-mcp spawn chain (pkill -P on POSIX,
   taskkill /T on Windows) before MCP client.close().

2. Register chroma process with pgid for supervisor shutdown cascade.

3. backfillAllProjects() now processes max 3 projects concurrently
   with a re-entrancy guard to prevent overlapping fire-and-forget runs.

Closes #2216, advances #2220, #2213

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: regenerate plugin artifacts after cherry-picks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: foundation consumers + Cursor/stdin/queue/docs fixes

F1 spawnHidden adoption (#2236):
- 8 spawn → spawnHidden conversions across worker-utils, ProcessManager,
  npx-cli (install/runtime), supervisor/process-registry

F3 getUptimeSeconds adoption (#2250):
- Server.ts:165 (THE BUG: returned ms)
- Server.ts:270, SessionRoutes.ts:326 (4th ms-bug consumer found),
  DataRoutes.ts:225 (refactor for consistency)

#2188 stdin '{}' fallback removal:
- Diagnostic logging to <DATA_DIR>/logs/runner-errors.log + CAPTURE_BROKEN
  marker; exit 0 to preserve Windows Terminal exit-code strategy

#2196 ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL docs:
- New docs/public/configuration/custom-anthropic-backends.mdx
- Note: issue may need separate auto-detect feature; docs document
  existing plumbing only

#2242 check-pending-queue endpoints:
- Point at /api/processing-status + /api/processing per DataRoutes.ts;
  honor CLAUDE_MEM_WORKER_PORT env

#2248 Cursor sessions never summarized:
- Pulled reporter wbingli's tested fix (commit 46eaba44)
- Bug A: cursor adapter now derives transcriptPath from cwd+sessionId
- Bug B: parser accepts both line.type and line.role
- Bug C: walk backward, prefer non-empty text, fallback to empty
- Tests: 10-case regression suite + tests/fixtures/cursor-session.jsonl

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: F2 paths namespace adoption (#2237 + #2238)

Replaced 24 hardcoded homedir() + '.claude-mem' sites across 18 source
files with paths.<accessor>() calls from src/shared/paths.ts.

Accessors used: dataDir, workerPid, settings, database, chroma,
combinedCerts, transcriptsConfig, transcriptsState, corpora,
supervisorRegistry, envFile, logsDir.

Sites converted (file:area):
- src/cli/claude-md-commands.ts (database)
- src/services/context/ContextConfigLoader.ts (settings)
- src/services/infrastructure/ProcessManager.ts (workerPid)
- src/services/infrastructure/WorktreeAdoption.ts (settings)
- src/services/integrations/CodexCliInstaller.ts (settings)
- src/services/sync/ChromaMcpManager.ts (chroma + combinedCerts)
- src/services/transcripts/config.ts (transcriptsConfig + transcriptsState)
- src/services/worker/ClaudeProvider.ts (envFile)
- src/services/worker/GeminiProvider.ts (envFile + 2 more)
- src/services/worker/http/routes/DataRoutes.ts (dataDir)
- src/services/worker/http/routes/SettingsRoutes.ts (settings + envFile)
- src/services/worker/knowledge/CorpusStore.ts (corpora)
- src/shared/EnvManager.ts (envFile)
- src/supervisor/index.ts (supervisorRegistry)
- src/supervisor/process-registry.ts (supervisorRegistry)
- src/supervisor/shutdown.ts (supervisorRegistry)
- src/utils/claude-md-utils.ts (database)
- src/utils/logger.ts (logsDir + settings, lazy to avoid cycle)

CLAUDE_MEM_DATA_DIR override now flows through 100% of the worker
runtime; no per-file env reads needed.

Verification:
- Grep guard: zero homedir+'.claude-mem' sites remain in src/
  (excluding paths.ts itself and SettingsDefaultsManager.ts)
- F2 invariant test: 3/3 pass (60 expects)
- Foundation tests: 19/19 pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: F4 provider classification + parser fence + OAuth keychain

F4 adoption (#2244 + #2254):
- Per-provider classifiers: classifyClaudeError, classifyGeminiError,
  classifyOpenRouterError. Each lives in the provider file.
- New retry helper at src/services/worker/retry.ts: withRetry() honors
  ClassifiedProviderError.kind; retriable=transient/rate_limit (with
  retryAfterMs); not retriable=unrecoverable/auth_invalid/quota_exhausted.
  maxRetries=2, perAttemptTimeout=30s, exponential backoff with jitter.
- GeminiProvider + OpenRouterProvider fetch calls wrapped with retry.
  Best-effort request-id capture (x-goog-request-id, x-request-id,
  x-openrouter-request-id) for dedup logging.
- Deleted unrecoverablePatterns allowlist at worker-service.ts:540 area;
  worker dispatches on err.kind instead.
- 28 new classifier tests at tests/worker/provider-classifiers.test.ts:
  429-no-Retry-After, 500-with-quota-exceeded, OverloadedError,
  per-provider auth_invalid signals.

#2233 Part A — parser fence handling:
- src/sdk/prompts.ts: removed 4 fence markers from XML example blocks.
  Model now sees plain XML, eliminating the failure-mode that drained
  quota via repeated retries.
- src/sdk/parser.ts: stripCodeFences() at top, called before
  parseAgentXml. Fence-tolerant regardless of model behavior.
- TODO comment references #2233 Part B (tool-use migration as separate
  scope).
- 4 fence-tolerance tests added to tests/sdk/parser.test.ts.

#2215 OAuth token keychain:
- New src/shared/oauth-token.ts (~360 LOC): readClaudeOAuthToken()
  reads from platform-native credential stores at worker spawn-time.
  - macOS: security find-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials"
  - Windows: PowerShell wrapper around CredRead (Win32 Advapi32.dll)
  - Linux: secret-tool lookup
  - Fallback: env CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN with JWT exp claim or sidecar
    expiresAt validation; refuses stale-token injection.
- EnvManager.buildIsolatedEnvWithFreshOAuth() (async) replaces silent
  process.env copy. Empty injection on absent; marker write on expired.
- <DATA_DIR>/oauth-stale.marker surfaces "re-login via Claude Desktop"
  via existing SessionStart additionalContext mechanism (context.ts).
- ClaudeProvider.startSession + KnowledgeAgent.prime/executeQuery now
  await the async env builder.
- 17 oauth-token tests covering decodeJwtExpMs, marker round-trip,
  env-fallback expiry detection.

Verification:
- npx tsc --noEmit: only pre-existing bun-types error
- bun test (foundations + new): 70 pass, 0 new fails (8 fails are
  pre-existing parser.test.ts cases unrelated to fence work)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: #2234 quota-aware wall-clock guard

New src/services/worker/RateLimitStore.ts (207 LOC) — vendor pattern from
meridian/rateLimitStore.ts (MIT, copied not depended).

API:
- class RateLimitStore: set/get/getAll/getMostRecentByWindow/size/clear,
  in-memory last-write-wins keyed by rateLimitType.
- globalRateLimitStore singleton.
- shouldAbortForQuota(authMethod, store, now?) → {abort, reason?, window?}
- isApiKeyAuth(authMethod): matches both verbose getAuthMethodDescription
  strings and concise "api_key".

Thresholds (auth-type gated):
- api_key: never aborts (user authorized per-call spend).
- cli/oauth/subscription:
  - five_hour utilization >= 0.95 OR resetsAt within 15min (with 0.85
    utilization floor to avoid false trip on freshly-reset windows)
  - seven_day_opus >= 0.93
  - seven_day_sonnet >= 0.92
  - seven_day >= 0.93
  - overage >= 0.95

ClaudeProvider integration (line 198, for-await loop):
- Detects message.type === 'system' && subtype === 'rate_limit'
- Records rate_limit_info via globalRateLimitStore.set
- Calls shouldAbortForQuota(authMethod, globalRateLimitStore)
- On abort: session.abortReason = 'quota:<window>', abortController.abort,
  break out of loop. Worker continues other sessions.

Health endpoint (Server.ts:174):
- New rateLimits field on /api/health from getMostRecentByWindow().
- Field shape: {five_hour?, seven_day?, seven_day_opus?, seven_day_sonnet?,
  overage?} each carrying utilization, status, resetsAt, observedAt.

Tests (tests/worker/rate-limit-store.test.ts):
- 22 cases covering store CRUD, isApiKeyAuth, abort decision matrix.
- api_key never aborts at any utilization.
- cli aborts at threshold breaches per window.
- Reset-grace buffer with utilization floor.

Verification:
- npx tsc --noEmit: only pre-existing bun error
- bun test tests/worker/rate-limit-store.test.ts: 22/22 pass
- bun test tests/claude-provider-resume.test.ts: 9/9 pass
- bun test tests/server/: 44/44 pass

Plugin artifacts regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: regenerate worker-service.cjs after final build-and-sync

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: align test assertions with F4 classification + timeout

Two test fixes for branch-introduced regressions vs main:

1. tests/gemini_provider.test.ts "should throw on other errors":
   F4's classifyGeminiError replaced upstream Error message with
   ClassifiedProviderError. Test was pinned to pre-F4 string.
   Updated assertion to match new "Gemini bad request (status 400)".

2. tests/infrastructure/graceful-shutdown.test.ts:
   Test pokes real ~/.claude-mem/supervisor.json registry which on a
   developer machine contains live worker + chroma-mcp PIDs. SIGTERM →
   wait → SIGKILL cascade takes ~6s end-to-end. Bumped per-test timeout
   to 15000ms. Underlying shutdown code unchanged. Future cleanup
   should mock getSupervisor() here.

Result: branch failure count == main (77 pre-existing failures).
No new regressions from this branch's work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: address 4 Greptile P1/P2 findings on PR #2282

P1 (real bug): clearStaleMarker silently broken in ESM
- src/shared/oauth-token.ts:14: add unlinkSync to top-level fs import
- src/shared/oauth-token.ts:342: drop inline require('fs'), call
  unlinkSync directly. ESM has no require, so the previous code threw
  ReferenceError swallowed by try/catch — making clearStaleMarker a
  permanent no-op. Stale oauth marker would persist indefinitely after
  Claude Desktop refreshed the token.

P2 (security): execSync shell-string interpolation
- src/shared/find-claude-executable.ts:39: execSync(`"${candidate}"
  --version`) → execFileSync(candidate, ['--version']). Path containing
  ", ;, & — reachable on Windows via crafted CLAUDE_CODE_PATH in
  settings.json — would otherwise produce a malformed/exploitable
  command.

P2 (security): PowerShell username injection
- src/shared/oauth-token.ts:119: userInfo().username escaped with PS
  single-quote convention (' → '') before interpolation into
  `'Claude Code-credentials:${user}'`. Defensive against future Windows
  versions or domain-joined machines that may permit ' in usernames.

P2 (style): Unreachable throw lastError post-loop
- src/services/worker/retry.ts:109: explained as the safety net for
  opts.maxRetries < 0 (pathological input where the loop never executes
  and lastError is undefined). Annotated with comment + descriptive
  fallback Error so the dead-looking code is now self-documenting.

Verification:
- npx tsc --noEmit: clean (only pre-existing bun-types error)
- bun test tests/shared/oauth-token.test.ts tests/worker/provider-classifiers.test.ts
  tests/worker/provider-errors.test.ts: 50 pass / 0 fail

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: tighten SECURITY.md data-flow and audit dates

Fixes CodeRabbit comments #3178957249 (Data Storage section overstated
"no external transmission" — softened to call out Claude Agent SDK,
alternate provider, Chroma MCP, OAuth keychain, and registry fetches)
and #3178957250 (Next Scheduled Audit was earlier than Last Updated;
bumped Last Updated to 2026-05-03 and audit to 2026-09-16) on PR #2282.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: drop inline require('fs') in paths.ts

Fixes CodeRabbit outside-diff comment on src/shared/paths.ts:25-29 from
PR #2282 review. resolveDataDir() ran require('fs') inside an ESM module
(this file uses import.meta.url and .js imports), which can break in
strict ESM environments. readFileSync now imports at the top alongside
existsSync/mkdirSync.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: block CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN from parent env (issue #2215)

Fixes CodeRabbit outside-diff comment on src/shared/EnvManager.ts:14-17
from PR #2282 review. The OAuth-token leak fix was bypassed because
buildIsolatedEnv() copied every parent env var that wasn't in
BLOCKED_ENV_VARS, but CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN was not blocked. A stale
parent token therefore still reached isolatedEnv even when the fresh
keychain read returned expired/absent — defeating the fix documented
inline at lines 178-183.

Adds CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN to BLOCKED_ENV_VARS and defensively deletes
it again at the top of buildIsolatedEnvWithFreshOAuth() so the
fresh-spawn-time read is the only path that can populate it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: validate cursor sessionId against path traversal

Fixes CodeRabbit comment #3178957252 on PR #2282. The Cursor adapter
took sessionId straight from stdin and concatenated it into a
join(homedir(), '.cursor', 'projects', ..., sessionId, ...) path. A
crafted value containing path separators or '..' segments could escape
~/.cursor/projects, and the later transcript read would then probe
arbitrary local files.

deriveCursorTranscriptPath() now rejects any sessionId that doesn't
match /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/ — Cursor's real session ids are UUID-style
identifiers, so the safe whitelist is non-disruptive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: scope stripCodeFences() to full-wrapper payloads only

Fixes CodeRabbit comment #3178957253 on PR #2282. The previous regex
greedily removed the first opening and last closing triple-backticks
anywhere in the input, which could mangle valid content with internal
fenced examples or surrounding prose — and ran before XML parsing so
it created false negatives.

stripCodeFences() now only strips when the entire payload is a single
fenced block (start-to-end, with optional language tag and surrounding
whitespace), capturing the inner content. Adds a regression test that
feeds prose with internal triple-backtick markers around a real
<observation> block and asserts the inner ``` are preserved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: honor abortSignal during retry backoff sleep

Fixes CodeRabbit comment #3178957263 on PR #2282. The retry helper used
an unconditional `setTimeout` Promise for backoff between attempts, so
an external abort that fired during the wait was delayed until the
timer completed.

The backoff now races setTimeout against opts.abortSignal: if the signal
flips, the timer is cleared and the Promise rejects with 'Aborted'
immediately. The abort listener is registered with { once: true } and
removed when the timer fires to avoid leaks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: abort immediately on provider-side rejected status

Fixes CodeRabbit comment #3178957261 on PR #2282. shouldAbortForQuota()
only checked utilization thresholds and reset-grace heuristics; a
snapshot with status='rejected' (or overageStatus='rejected' on the
overage window) but no utilization number could still return
{ abort: false }, letting the worker keep consuming after the provider
had already declared the bucket exhausted.

Provider-side rejection is now checked before utilization. When either
rejection signal is present the guard returns abort=true with reason
"quota:<window> rejected by provider".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: only bump Chroma watermark on confirmed batch writes

Fixes CodeRabbit comments #3178957259 (watermark advances on swallowed
batch failures) and #3178957260 (backfillInProgress can stick true if
init throws) on PR #2282.

addDocuments() previously logged and swallowed per-batch failures with a
void return type, so all three backfill loops (observations, summaries,
prompts) bumped the watermark unconditionally after the call —
turning a transient Chroma failure into permanently-skipped records.
addDocuments() now returns the count of documents that actually landed
(including delete+add reconcile retries), and each loop only advances
the watermark when the batch wrote successfully. Failed batches log a
debug message and continue so the loop still gets through the rest.

backfillAllProjects() now constructs SessionStore and ChromaSync inside
a try block so a constructor throw can't leave the static
backfillInProgress guard stuck true and silently skip every later
backfill. The finally always clears the guard and best-effort closes
each resource.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: fall back to pid kill when process group is gone

Fixes CodeRabbit outside-diff comment on src/supervisor/shutdown.ts:118-134
from PR #2282 review. signalProcess() returned silently when a pgid was
present and process.kill(-pgid, signal) threw ESRCH, never attempting
the per-pid signal. With the new chroma registration path that records a
pgid alongside the pid, an already-collapsed group could turn shutdown
into a no-op even though the root pid was still alive.

The POSIX branch now tries -pgid first when present, and on ESRCH falls
through to process.kill(pid, signal). Non-ESRCH errors still propagate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: settings path, uptime clamp, fetch timeouts

Fixes three smaller CodeRabbit issues on PR #2282:

- SettingsRoutes (outside-diff #2282 review on lines 65-79): the
  parse-error response told users to delete ~/.claude-mem/settings.json
  even when paths.settings() resolved elsewhere. Now uses the resolved
  settingsPath variable in the message.

- uptime.ts (#3178957264 / lines 2-3): getUptimeSeconds() could return
  a negative value if startedAtMs was in the future or the system clock
  moved backward. Clamps with Math.max(0, ...) so health endpoints
  never see negative seconds.

- check-pending-queue.ts (#3178957248 / lines 27-45): checkWorkerHealth,
  getProcessingStatus and triggerProcessing all called fetch with no
  timeout, so the script could block forever if the worker accepted the
  TCP connection but never responded. Wraps each fetch with an
  AbortController + 10s timeout that throws a clear timeout message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: walk descendants recursively when killing chroma-mcp tree

Fixes CodeRabbit comment #3178957258 on PR #2282. The POSIX teardown in
ChromaMcpManager.killProcessTree() relied on `pkill -P <pid>`, which
only signals direct children. Under uv, chroma-mcp spawns python as a
grandchild — when uv exits and python re-parents to init, pkill -P
never reaches it and the descendant survives the "tree kill".

killProcessTree() now collects the full descendant set via a recursive
`pgrep -P` walk before each signal phase. The walk returns leaves first
so signals propagate bottom-up (SIGTERM children before their parents,
then again for SIGKILL after the 500ms grace window so any layer that
re-parented during teardown still gets cleaned up). pgrep failures
(no children, missing binary) return [] so this stays best-effort and
falls back to the existing per-pid signal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: tolerate malformed JSONL lines in transcript-parser

Fixes Greptile P1 comment 3178964456 on PR #2282.

extractLastMessageFromJsonl previously called JSON.parse(rawLine) with no
guard. A truncated/malformed JSONL line — common when a transcript was
crashed mid-write or partially flushed — would throw SyntaxError, crash
the summarization pipeline for that session, and silently lose all
prior valid messages.

Fix: wrap JSON.parse in try/catch and skip bad lines. The empty-line
guard only catches truly empty strings, not malformed fragments.

Regression tests added for two cases:
- Mixed valid + truncated lines: returns last valid match.
- All lines malformed: returns empty string (no throw).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: classify FK constraint failures BEFORE provider classifier

Fixes Greptile P1 comment 3178979583 on PR #2282.

The F4 #2244 work introduced a regression: reclassifyAtDispatch always
returns a non-null ClassifiedProviderError for known agent types
(Claude/Gemini/OpenRouter), so the isFkConstraintFailure branch was dead
code. Per-provider classifiers don't recognize "FOREIGN KEY constraint
failed", so SQLite FK failures fell through to the default 'transient'
kind and would retry indefinitely — restart loop on corrupted session
DB state.

Old unrecoverablePatterns explicitly listed FK constraint as
unrecoverable; restoring that semantic by checking FK FIRST and only
deferring to the classifier when not an FK error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: validate CLAUDE_MEM_WORKER_PORT in check-pending-queue

Parse the env var, range-check (1-65535), and fall back to 37777 with a
console.warn on invalid input instead of letting a malformed value flow
into the URL builder unchecked (CodeRabbit Minor on PR #2282).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: SIGKILL union of pre-TERM and post-wait descendant sets

When the chroma-mcp root exits during the SIGTERM grace window, its
descendants get re-parented to init and drop out of the post-wait
pgrep -P scan. Without including the pre-TERM snapshot, those
re-parented PIDs would never receive SIGKILL even though they were
definitely children before SIGTERM and may still be alive (CodeRabbit
Major on PR #2282).

Compute Array.from(new Set([...descendantsBeforeTerm, ...descendantsBeforeKill]))
and SIGKILL the union. The two sets typically overlap, so dedupe is
required.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: enforce addDocuments return-count in direct sync paths

syncObservation/syncSummary/syncUserPrompt now capture the written count
from addDocuments() and only bump the watermark when every requested
document landed in Chroma. addDocuments() tolerates per-batch failures
(returns the actual written count), so the previous unconditional bump
was silently marking unsynced rows as synced on transient errors —
preventing the next backfill from retrying them (CodeRabbit Major on PR
#2282).

A partial write now logs a warn with the (requested, written) pair and
preserves retryability on the next pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: guard backfill watermark against non-contiguous failures

The backfill watermark is a single monotonic id, so it cannot represent
sparse success: "synced through 200, gap at 201–250, then 251 onward"
would, on restart, skip 201–250 forever because the watermark sat at
either 200 or 251 — both lose data (CodeRabbit Major on PR #2282).

Add a per-loop hadGap flag to backfillObservations / backfillSummaries /
backfillPrompts. Once any batch under-writes, every subsequent batch
must also skip the bump, regardless of whether it itself succeeded.
Also tighten the failure check from `writtenInBatch <= 0` to
`writtenInBatch < batch.length` so partial-batch writes are caught.

The watermark stays at the last contiguously-synced position; the next
backfill pass retries from there, eventually closing the gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: clear oauth-stale marker when token is absent

When an OAuth token disappears entirely (user logs out, keychain
cleared), buildIsolatedEnvWithFreshOAuth's absent branch was leaving any
prior stale-marker file in place. The session-start hook would then keep
surfacing an "expired token, re-login" warning even though the token is
no longer expired — it's gone, and re-login was already done elsewhere
or not applicable (CodeRabbit Minor on PR #2282).

Call clearStaleMarker() in the absent branch the same way the present
branch already does. Add a regression test exercising the full
buildIsolatedEnvWithFreshOAuth path: pre-write a marker, force absent
via spoofed unsupported platform, assert the marker is gone after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: skip unknown message.content shapes instead of throwing

extractLastMessageFromJsonl already tolerates malformed JSONL lines
(JSON.parse failure -> continue), but a valid JSON line whose
message.content is an unexpected type (null, number, plain object) was
still throwing — contradicting the new tolerance and crashing the entire
summary pipeline on a single weird line (CodeRabbit Major + Greptile P1
on PR #2282).

Replace the `throw new Error(...)` with `continue` so a single bad
content shape skips that line instead of failing the whole transcript
read. Forward compat: future content schemas land harmlessly.

Add regression tests covering null, number, and plain-object content;
each must not throw and must fall back to the most recent valid line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: guard null/primitive entries in message.content array

Fixes CodeRabbit comment 3179004190 on PR #2282.

The Array.isArray branch previously did `c.type === 'text'` directly,
which throws if `c` is null or a primitive — possible in malformed logs.
Tightened the filter with a type guard: requires c to be a non-null
object with type === 'text' and a string text field. Same defensive
class as the malformed-line and unknown-content-shape tolerances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-03 22:27:07 -07:00

7.8 KiB

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Only the latest released version of claude-mem receives security updates. Please upgrade to the latest version before reporting a vulnerability.

Version Supported
latest
older

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security vulnerability in claude-mem, please report it by:

  1. DO NOT create a public GitHub issue, pull request, or discussion
  2. Email alex@cmem.ai with details, OR use GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" button under the Security tab to open a private security advisory
  3. Include steps to reproduce, impact assessment, affected version(s), and suggested fixes if possible

Scope: This policy covers the claude-mem plugin and its bundled components (hooks, worker service, SQLite/Chroma sync, viewer UI, search/planning skills). Issues in upstream dependencies should be reported to those projects directly, but feel free to flag them to us as well.

We take security seriously, will acknowledge valid reports within 48 hours, and aim to ship a fix in the next release.

Security Measures

Command Injection Prevention

Claude-mem executes system commands for git operations and process management. We have implemented comprehensive protections against command injection:

Safe Command Execution

  • Array-based Arguments: All commands use array-based arguments to prevent shell interpretation
  • No Shell Execution: shell: false is explicitly set for all spawn operations involving user input
  • Input Validation: All user-controlled parameters are validated before use

Example Safe Pattern

// ✅ SAFE: Array-based arguments with validation
if (!isValidBranchName(userInput)) {
  throw new Error('Invalid input');
}
spawnSync('git', ['checkout', userInput], { shell: false });

// ❌ UNSAFE: Never do this
execSync(`git checkout ${userInput}`);

Input Validation

All user-controlled inputs are validated using whitelists and strict patterns:

  • Branch Names: Must match /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._/-]*$/ and not contain ..
  • Port Numbers: Must be numeric and within range 1024-65535
  • File Paths: All paths are joined using path.join() to prevent traversal

Process Management

  • PID File Protection: Process IDs are stored in user's data directory (~/.claude-mem/)
  • Port Validation: Worker port is validated before binding
  • Health Checks: Worker health is verified before processing requests

Privacy Controls

Claude-mem includes dual-tag system for content privacy:

  • <private>content</private> - User-level privacy (prevents storage)
  • <claude-mem-context>content</claude-mem-context> - System-level tag (prevents recursive storage)

Tags are stripped at the hook layer before data reaches worker/database.

Security Audit History

2025-12-16: Command Injection Vulnerability (Issue #354)

  • Severity: CRITICAL
  • Status: RESOLVED
  • Affected Versions: All versions prior to fix
  • Fixed In: Current version
  • Vulnerabilities Found: 3
  • Vulnerabilities Fixed: 3

Summary of Fixes:

  1. Replaced string interpolation with array-based arguments in BranchManager.ts
  2. Added isValidBranchName() validation function
  3. Removed unnecessary shell usage in bun-path.ts
  4. Created comprehensive security test suite

Security Best Practices for Contributors

When Adding Command Execution

  1. NEVER use shell with user input:

    // ❌ NEVER
    execSync(`command ${userInput}`);
    spawn('command', [...], { shell: true });
    
    // ✅ ALWAYS
    spawnSync('command', [userInput], { shell: false });
    
  2. ALWAYS validate user input:

    if (!isValidInput(userInput)) {
      throw new Error('Invalid input');
    }
    
  3. Use array-based arguments:

    // ❌ NEVER
    execSync(`git ${command} ${arg}`);
    
    // ✅ ALWAYS
    spawnSync('git', [command, arg], { shell: false });
    
  4. Explicitly set shell: false:

    spawnSync('command', args, { shell: false });
    

When Adding User Input

  1. Whitelist validation over blacklist
  2. Strict regex patterns for format validation
  3. Type checking for expected data types
  4. Range validation for numeric inputs
  5. Length limits for string inputs

Code Review Checklist

Before submitting a PR with command execution or user input handling:

  • No execSync with string interpolation or template literals
  • No shell: true when user input is involved
  • All spawn/spawnSync calls use array arguments
  • Input validation is present for all user-controlled parameters
  • Security tests are added for new attack vectors
  • Code follows the safe patterns described above

Dependencies

We regularly audit dependencies for vulnerabilities:

  • npm audit: Run before each release
  • Dependabot: Enabled for automatic security updates
  • Manual Review: Critical dependencies reviewed quarterly

Data Storage

Claude-mem stores data locally in ~/.claude-mem/:

  • Database: SQLite3 at ~/.claude-mem/claude-mem.db
  • Vector Store: Chroma at ~/.claude-mem/chroma/
  • Logs: ~/.claude-mem/logs/
  • Settings: ~/.claude-mem/settings.json

All claude-mem state files (database, vector store, logs, settings, supervisor and PID files) are written to the local user directory and are not uploaded by claude-mem itself. Claude-mem does not collect telemetry.

However, by design claude-mem invokes upstream model providers and optional integrations to do its work, so observation/transcript/prompt content can leave the machine through those channels:

  • Claude Agent SDK (default summarization/observation path): sends prompts and transcript context to Anthropic's API.
  • Alternate providers (gemini, openrouter): when configured, send the same context to those providers instead.
  • Chroma MCP / chroma-mcp: when enabled, computes embeddings via the configured embedding backend, which may be a remote API depending on the user's chroma-mcp configuration.
  • OAuth / keychain reads: claude-mem reads the Claude Code OAuth token from the platform-native credential store at spawn time. The token is injected into worker subprocesses but is not transmitted by claude-mem.
  • GitHub releases / npm registry: version-check and self-update flows fetch metadata from public registries.

Review your provider/Chroma configuration in ~/.claude-mem/settings.json and ~/.claude-mem/.env before sending sensitive content. Use <private>...</private> tags to keep specific content out of the local store.

Permissions

Claude-mem requires:

  • File System: Read/write to ~/.claude-mem/ and ~/.claude/plugins/
  • Network: HTTP server on localhost (default port 37777)
  • Process Management: Spawn worker processes, manage PIDs

No elevated privileges (root/administrator) are required.

Secure Defaults

  • Worker Host: Binds to 127.0.0.1 by default (localhost only)
  • Worker Port: User-configurable, validates range 1024-65535
  • Log Level: INFO by default (no sensitive data in logs)
  • Privacy Tags: Auto-strips private content before storage

Updates

Security patches are released as soon as possible after discovery. Users should:

  1. Keep claude-mem updated to the latest version
  2. Monitor GitHub releases for security announcements
  3. Review CHANGELOG.md for security-related changes

Questions?

For security-related questions (non-vulnerabilities), please:

  1. Review code comments in security-critical files
  2. Open a GitHub Discussion (not an Issue) for general security questions
  3. For sensitive questions, email alex@cmem.ai

Last Updated: 2026-05-03 Last Audit: 2025-12-16 (Issue #354) Next Scheduled Audit: 2026-09-16